The single variable that can break Iran's dominant strategy. A complete analysis of what sanctions relief must look like, why the Bessent 19 March waiver is 4.3% of the required threshold, and why only the Treasury — not the Navy — can break the trap.
Iran's Yuan strategy is strictly dominant as long as G+S > 0. The question for Equation 12 is: what value of Sr makes this condition fail?
Sr reduces Iran's cost of staying in the dollar system. As Sr rises, the cost of dollar pricing falls. At some threshold, yuan is no longer the dominant strategy.
Dominance breaks exactly when Sr = G+S. Below this threshold, Yuan remains dominant. At or above it, Iran's dollar strategy becomes at least as good as yuan — the trap breaks.
Even if all sanctions are lifted (Sr=S=10), Iran still prefers yuan if G>0. The relief must compensate for the entire yuan advantage G as well as the sanctions cost S. This is why Sr=18 is so demanding: it requires restoring the dollar's attractiveness beyond mere sanctions removal.
Each diplomatic instrument has an Sr value. The ladder below maps every available U.S. lever to its payoff-scale impact. The Bessent offer sits at the very bottom.
Iran's annual yuan gain G ≈ 8 units ≈ $18B/year. The one-time $14B waiver represents 0.78 units of Sr — a temporary, asset-specific reduction in sanctions burden.
The dominance condition is satisfied at 17.22. Iran's Yuan strategy remains strictly dominant. The waiver reduced the dominance margin by 4.3% — from 18 to 17.22. The trap is structurally unchanged.
Equation 12's Sr requires a permanent reduction in Iran's sanctions cost S. The Bessent waiver is temporary (10–14 days), asset-specific (existing floating inventory), and made without Iranian coordination. The day after the 140M barrels clear, Iran's S is identical to before. Sr(structural) = 0.
Drag Sr to see how the dominance condition changes. The chart shows how Iran's payoff advantage shrinks as Sr rises toward the threshold. mediator_status gates whether Sr can rise at all.