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02 Apr 2026 23:19 UTC
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Research Series
E*≈13.7
E*/E2.74×
c≈0.87
m3.0
E5
H7
G8
S10
k1.3
Live
CLOSUREDay —
Sr0.78 / 18 req.
Dom.Margin17.22
U(Esc)−20.7
U(Acc)−7
TRAPACTIVE
ρ_I0.030
ν3
Ps12
n1.3
Sr Cov.4%
Research Articles ↗
Live price feed · oilpriceapi.com Real-time Brent crude + Natural Gas fetched directly from oilpriceapi.com by this page. Refreshes every 6 hours on weekdays. 24h Δ reflects Hormuz closure risk premium. Brent feeds directly into E* = E × [1 + c(m−1)] — Brent ↑ → c ↑ → E* ↑. API key required — set once in admin panel → Keys & Config (saved to browser localStorage, never uploaded).
Geoeconomics · Game Theory · Strategic Analysis

THE
HORMUZ
GAMBIT

A running game-theoretic analysis of Iran's de-dollarisation strategy, the 2026 Hormuz crisis, and the structural conditions under which the petrodollar's fifty-two-year monopoly on energy invoicing is being challenged. Each analysis is a standalone module. New modules added as events develop.

Active analyses published 05
Equations formalised 13
Dominant strategy broken No
Sr required vs offered 18 vs 0.78
Active Analyses 6 live · 0 in preparation
ANALYSIS-001 Live
E* = E × [1 + c(m − 1)]
The Hormuz Commitment Device
Complete mathematical and strategic analysis of Equation 5 — how Iran weaponises the Strait of Hormuz to amplify U.S. escalation costs beyond what military doctrine can absorb. Includes full derivation, all boundary conditions, seven worked examples spanning 1987 to the live March 2026 crisis, sensitivity analysis across the full c × m parameter space, and a real-world test against the Bessent 19 March sanctions waiver.
Commitment Device Eq. 5 Hormuz Strait Credibility Geographic Multiplier
Live calibration · 21 March 2026
E* (effective cost)
14.0
E*/E amplification
2.80×
U.S. Escalate payoff
−21
Deterrence gap
14.0
Bessent offer · 19 March 2026
Sr(offered) = 0.78 units
Sr(required) = G + S = 18
Coverage = 4.3% of threshold
Dominant strategy: intact. E*: unchanged. The waiver does not affect c, m, or E.
ANALYSIS-002 Live
a* = argmax min U_A(s,a)
The Dominant Strategy Trap
Deep analysis of Equation 4 — the U.S. minimax problem. Why Washington cannot escape the Yuan row of the payoff matrix, why both High Response columns are negative, and the formal proof that the (0,0) status quo is permanently inaccessible once Iran's dominant strategy is active.
Minimax Eq. 4 Nash Equilibrium Payoff Matrix
ANALYSIS-003 Live
G_s + kν > P_s⁽⁰⁾(1−δ)^k
The Swing Producer Cascade
Equation 7 — the network externality tipping model for Persian Gulf state de-dollarisation. Why the cascade is supermodular, when the tipping threshold is crossed, and how Saudi Arabia's Yanbu diversion has inadvertently demonstrated the pipeline arithmetic that validates m ≈ 3.
Cascade Eq. 7 Swing Producers Network Effects
ANALYSIS-004 Live
S_r ≥ G + S = 18
The Sanctions Relief Threshold
Equation 12 — the only variable that can break Iran's dominant strategy. A complete map of the Sr ladder from Bessent's 0.78-unit waiver to the 18-unit full threshold. Includes the Bessent 19 March announcement as a live calibration event.
Sanctions Relief Eq. 12 Dominance Condition Diplomacy
ANALYSIS-005 Live
H_{t+1} = H_t · (1 − ρ_I − n_t·ρ_S)
Hegemony Decay & the Repeated Game
Equation 8 — the intertemporal trap. How each round of yuan-denominated Hormuz transit compounds the erosion of dollar hegemony, why Iran's payoff is constant at G every round while U.S. payoff declines, and why the trap tightens automatically without strategy changes.
Repeated Game Eq. 8 Hegemony Decay Intertemporal
ANALYSIS-006 Live
m = m_base + (1 − m_res) × α
The Chokepoint Ceiling
The m_ceiling metric — the minimum geographic multiplier achievable if all bypass infrastructure were fully operational. Pipeline expansion simulator with toggleable routes, Bab al-Mandab dual-strait scenario, and why Red Sea-terminating pipelines substitute one chokepoint for another. m_ceiling barely moves: 3.0 → 3.15 at full build.
Geographic Multiplier m_ceiling Pipeline Bypass Bab al-Mandab
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About This Research
Framework

Each analysis in this series formalises one equation from a complete game-theoretic model of Iran's yuan shift strategy. The full model contains 13 equations spanning the 2-player payoff matrix, strict dominance, Nash equilibrium, the dominant strategy trap, Hormuz commitment device, China's strategy, the Swing Producer cascade, repeated game hegemony decay, and the coalition extension (naval escort, separability, dominance resilience, and the three-column minimax).

Methodology

All equations are derived from first principles with full boundary condition analysis, sensitivity tables, and worked numerical examples calibrated against live market data. Every analysis includes a real-world validation test against observed events in the March 2026 Hormuz crisis — treating the live geopolitical situation as an empirical test of the model's predictions.

Series status

The Hormuz Gambit is a running series updated as events develop. Analysis-001 (Equation 5) was published 17 March and updated 19 March with the Bessent waiver assessment. Analyses 002–005 are in preparation and will be published as the crisis evolves. Each module is a standalone site deployable independently on GitHub Pages.